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I. Introduction
On June 19, 208, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its
opinion in the case of Metropolitan Li/c Insurance Co.
et al v. Glenn (MletLife), affirming that the petitioner.,
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (MetLife)' had
abused its discretion in denying the respondent', Wanda
Glenn, long-term disabilits benefits.' The ruling
affirms the holding of the the Sixth Circuit U.S. Court
of Appeals, which found that MetLife "acted under
a conflict of interest" and failed to provide a fair and
balanced administrative process when it detennined
whether to approve Glenn's long-term disability
benefits. Although the type of insurance benefit at
issue in the MetJife case was long-term disability
insurance, the Supreme Court's decision has broader
implications for all employee benefit programs that the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA)covers.
Broadly, E-RISA sets standards for private sector
"employee welfare benefit plans" and "employee
pension benefit plans."4 "imployee welfare benefit
plans" include insurance plans such as the long-
term disability benefit at issue here and also health
insurance plans provided by private employers.
lMeLi/ respondent, Glenn, sought judicial review of
MetLife's denial of her long-term benefits as allowed
under 1132 of ERISA.6 This civil remedy is available
to any participant or beneficiary of an ERISA-covered
benefit plan.' Applying Firestone v. Bruch, the Court
treated the benefit plan administrator as a trustee of a
common-law trust8 so that a conflict of interest within
that administrator "must be weighed as a factor in
determining whether there is an abuse of discretion."9
Under this standard, the Court found that the Circuit
Court properly found, weighed, and ruled that MetLife
improperly acted upon its conflict of interest as a plan
administrator and payor.m I)The Court's ruling affirmed
the decision against MetLife."
Six justices in MeiLie agreed to rule against the
petitioner insurance company, but only five justices
agreed to the majority opinion in whole." Concurring
only in part, Justices Roberts and Kennedy disagreed
as to how much an insurer's conflict of interest should
be weighed in an action arising under ERISAt and
how that conflict of interest weight should be applied
to the present case.14
At first blush, some reviewers have suggested that
the Supreme Court has "put the thumb on the scale
in the employees' favor.""' Ihis paper summarizes
and examines the Court's holding in Metife and its
application of irestone, and examines it and to what
extent this decision will shift policy under ERISA.
IL. MetLife v. Glenn
The following section describes the facts behind
rMetif/ x: Glenn and discusses the sequential court
holdings up to and including the recent Supreme Court
decision.
A. Facts
In 2000, the respondent in fetfif/, Wanda Glenn, was
an employee of Sears, Roebuck & Company when
she was diagnosed with a disabling heart malady
which rendered her unable to continue working.'' As
the long-term disability insurance administrator and
insurance payor for Sears, MetLife initially approved
Glenn for 24 months of disability benefits." MetLife
further referred Glenn to a law firm so that she
could apply for long-term disability benefits through
the Federal Social Security program. " Glenn was
subsequently determined to qualify for the benefit
under Social Security in 2002, retroactive to 2000.19
MetLife demanded and received over $13,000 out of
the retroactive Social Security payments from Glenn,2
with the remainder of the retroactive payments going to
the lasw firm that helped petition for the Social Security
disability determination.21
To continue receiving disability benefits from MetLife
beyond 24 months, MetI ife required Glenn to be
exaluated by a much stricter standardi' In denying
extended benefits. MetI ife appeaied to have relied on
a single esvaluation from Glenn's phy sician, Dr. Patel,
wxhere he indicated that Glenn "w as able to wxork in
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a sedentary physical exertion level occupation."23
MetLife appeared to give no weight to other. more
recent, more detailed and more declarative evaluations
by Dr. Patel, namely that Glenn was unable to
"handle any kind of stress well at her work." 4 Glenn
subsequently filed appeals with MetLife to reconsider
the determination.25 MetLife eventually referred the
case to an external medical evaluation consultant, Dr.
Pujara. Upon later review MetL tife was found to have
only forwarded Dr. Patel's negative evaluations to Dr.
Pujara, while excluding Dr. Patel's other evaluations,
which argued for Glenn's continued disability status.27
Although Dr. Pujara's report on Glenn's status was
arguably ambiguous, Metife used the negative
findings to deny once again Glenn's further disability
coverage.28 Glenn finallx sued MetLife under the
civil action provisions of ERISA.29 The District
Court granted MetLife's cross-motion for summary
judgment based on the administrative record and
Glenn subsequently appealed."
B. The Sixth Circuit
On appeal. the U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
reviewed the lower court's decision de novo, applying
the 'arbitrary and capricious' standard [as did the
lower court], because the plan at issue granted the plan
administrator discretionary authority to interpret terms
of the plan and to determine benefits."31 The Court of
Appeals agreed with the District Court that MetLife had
an inherent conflict of interest in being authorized both
to "decide whether an employee is eligible for benefits
and to pay those benefits," and that this conflict was a
relevant factor to be weighed in "determining whether
abuse of discretion had taken place."32 Nonetheless,
the Court of Appeals found that the District Court
had not appropriately given consideration to this
inherent conflict of interest.) Ultimately, the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's
decision. finding that "MetLife acted under a conflict
of interest,"34 and that MetLiife failed to consider and
reconcile fully the Social Security Administration's
determination and other phy sician's exvaluations, wxhich
found Glenn to be peimanently disabled eontrary to
Meti ife's oxwn fmnal deternmination.
Thbe ItS. Supremie C ourt granted certiorari to
MetI ife's request that the C ourt determine "wh ether
a plan administrator that both exvaluates and pay s
claims operates under a conflict of interest in making
discretionary beneti t deteirminations.' '6 Previously.
lires tone only indicated that an employer, and not an
insurance plan administrator, who evaluates and pays
claims, operates under an inherent conflict of interest.3
IFurther, the Supreme Court accepted the suggestion to
determine "how any such conflict should be taken into
account on judicial review of a discretionary benefit
determination."'8
D. Holding
In his majority opinion., Justice Breyer first affirmed
the Sixth Circuit's use of Firestone to apply trust law
to the case at bar. This approach used a deferential
standard of review where the plan administrator has
"discretionarx authority to determine eligibility for
benefits."" Moving to the question of whether a
conflict of interest exists for a plan administrator, as
the Court found for an employer in Firestone, MetLife
attempted to make an argument that an employer has a
much more implicit conflict.40 ,ietLife further argued
that finding such a conflict for plan administrators
would run contrary to both "ERISA's efforts to avoid
complex review proceedings. . .[and] with Congress's
efforts not to deter employers from setting up benefit
plans."41
Breyer conceded that a plan administrator, unlike an
employer, is incentivized through the marketplace to
provide accurate and less biased claims processing
by the mere fact that a processer, with a reputation
for inaccurate or biased claims, will lose business.42
Breyer argued that, although the market decreases
the risk of inaccuracy and bias. the market does not
fully eliminate that risk.4 3 First, according to Breyer,
"the employer's own conflict" may lead to its choice
of the thrifty insurance plan over an accurate one. 44
Further. Breyer found that "ERISA imposes higher-
than-marketplace quality standards on insurers" which
mandates a duty to plan beneficiaries and "full and fair
review of claim denials."45
Moving to the matter of how to apply this conflict of
interest in matters of benefit determination, the majority
took a less structured approach. Breyer stated that
new "special burden-of-proof rules . .. [and] special
procedural or evidentiary rules" are unnecessary.46
Rather, the major'ity held that the Frirestlone model is a
multi-factor wxeight test. wvhereby the eourts vwill "take
account ot sexveral (different consideiations of vvbich
eonfliet ot interest is one.'4 E xplaining fuither:
In such instances. anx one factor wvill act as a
tiebreaker wvhen the other factors are closely
balaneed. the degree of eloseness necessary
depending upon the tiebreaking faetor's inherent
or ease-speeifie inmpoitance. T he cnfliet of
interest at issue here, fori exanmple, should prove
more important (perhaps of great importance)
where circumstances suggest a higher likelihood
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that it affected the benefits decisions, including,
but not limited to, cases where an insurance
company administrator has a history of biased
claims administration.48
Applying this model to the lower circuit's decision, the
Supreme Court found that "'the Court of Appeals gaxve
the conflict weight to some degree,"49 but that other
factors were given heavier weight to tip the scale in
favor of the respondent, Glenn. These factors included
the un-reconciled discrepancies between MetLife's
own benefit determination and the Social Security
Administration's determination, the failure to give all
of Dr. Patel's evaluations to the independent reviewer,
Dr. Pujara, and the failure to factor properly all of Dr.
Patel's and Dr. Pujara's evaluations into MetLife's
final determination.so
Closing the majority's affirmation against MetLife,
Breyer used the case of tUniversal Camera Corpx. V
NLRBsi to support the majority's decision and to avoid
dictating an exacting formula with which to factor in
a conflict of interest: "the want of certainty in judicial
standards partly reflects the intractability of any
formula to furnish definiteness of content for all the
impalpable factors involved in judicial review."52
E. Concurrences in Part
Concurring Justices Roberts and Kennedy, however,
split from the five justice majority on the majority's
method of factoring in an insurer's conflict of interest
and the application to the case at bar. Although Chief
Justice Roberts agreed with the majority's finding that
an insurer, like an employer, who administers and funds
a plan, has a conflict of interest,:" he expressed the
opinion that the majority went too far with a "kitchen-
sink approach."54 Rather, Roberts would prefer that
consideration of a conflict of interest in judicial review
were limited to those cases in which the evidence
potentially implied "that the benefits denial was
motivated or affected by the administrator's conflict."
As a matter of policy, Roberts argued, "certainty and
predictability" are critical guarantees to employ ers
proxviding benefits pursuant to ERISA.5 I)espite this
disagieement in judicial model constiuction. Roberts
ultimately agieed xxith the resulting judgment against
Meti ife, finding that the inconsistencies in MetI ite's
determinations proxvided adequate deciding xxeight
"wxhollx apart from MetLife's conflict of interest."
Conxersely, Justice Kennedy agreed xwith the
framexxork constructed by the majority, but disagreed
xxith the ultimate attirmation of the Sixth C iicuit Court
otfAppeals judgment against Met] ite. According to
Kennedy, the majority 's model provided protection for
"the interests otfplan beneficiaries without undermining
the ability of insurance companies to act. .. as plan
administrators and [payors]."59 The protection for
insurance companies, Kennedy elucidated, arose from
the majority's "recognition that a structural conflict
should prove less important" where there is adequate
evidence that the insurer
has insulated the benefit
determinations from this
conflict.>o IBy simply
affirming the Sixth Circuit
decision, Kennedy asserted
that Mettife was deprived
of its fair day in court with
the newly minted standard
of review.' Accordino to
Kennedy, the case should
be remanded, allowing
MetLifetoprovideevidence
that Glenn's benefit denial
was adequately insulated
from MetILife's conflict
of interest. Ihis decision
then would allow for a
rebalancing of the multi-
factor test to determine
if the other discrepancies
were egregious enough to
condemn MetLife without
the conflict of interest.62
F. The Dissent
Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion, joined by Justice
Thomas. combined the spirits of the disagreements
voiced by Justices Roberts and Kennedy. Scalia wrote
that, although he agreed that MetLife had a conflict
of interest vis-a-vis its dual role as benefits determiner
and payor63 if a court were to apply the majority's
multi-factor test, the factors would "all be chucked
into a brown paper bag and shaken up to determine
the answer."6 >Like Chief Justice Roberts, Scalia
wxould only alloxw inclusion of a conflict of interest
as a deciding tactor it and when ev idence suggests
that "the conflict actually and improperly motixvates
the decision."' Scalia hased his perspectixe on a
constructionist adoption of the Second Restatement
ot Trusts, wxhereby a court xxould substitute a de
noxvo judginent xxhere a plan admimsitator "had no
discretion [or] had discretion and abused it."66 Similar
to Kennedy, Scatia xxould remand the case at bar tor
rexviewx of Glenn's benefit denial. JUlike Kennedy,
Scalia would completely exclude reassessment or
consideration of any such conflict of interest held by
-MetI ife.61
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G. Surnary of MetLif
Although the nine justices disagreed on the
circumstances in which a conflict of interest should
be factored into the judicial review of an employee
benefits determination, they all agreed that a conflict
of interest is present in some form for those third-party
insurers that both determine a participant's eligibility
for a benefit and directly pay for that benefit. 6,This
homogeny should provide ERISA payors cautionary
notice that any inappropriate application of their
inherent conflict of interest will be viewed with serious
aversion by the courts. The result, in itself, achieves
the majority's goal of affirming a "higher-than-
marketplace quality standard" on those insurers that
provide ERISA benefits.69
III. Firestone v..Bruch
Given the weight of precedent accorded to the 1989
Firestone decision in AdfetLife, this article briefly turns
to review Firestone and its application to ERISA.
A. Facts
In 1980., the petitioner employer, Firestone and Rubber
Co. (Firestone), provided to its employees a number
of ERISA-governed employee pension and welfare
benefit plans, which Firestone self-administered and
paid.70 That same year. Firestone sold a number of its
plants, which employed over 500 workers, to another
corporation' 1 After the sale, Firestone essentially
separated itself as an employer from the workers in
the plants that had been sold. As a result, a number
of the workers filed for severance benefits under the
termination pay plan - one of the ERISA-governed
benefit plans.2 Several other respondents petitioned
Firestone for disclosure of benefit provisions as
allowed by ERISA.73 Firestone first denied the
workers' request for severance under the termination
pay plan arguing that the plan's trigger for severance
benefits of a "reduction in work force" was not met by
the sale of the plants." In addition, Firestone denied
the request for disclosure citing that the employees
"we rc no longer participants" and theretfore not
entitled to disclosure under FERISA. T he employees
subsequently filed a civ il action as allowxed under
§1ll32(a)(1) of ERISAk76
B.Lwer Cour Decisions
Simnilar to the procedural history of Met Life, the
District Court granted significant deference to the
determinations by Fircstone and found in their
faxvor.' First, the District C ourt found that Firestone's
"decision not to pay severance benefits to respondents
under the termination pay plan was not arbitrary or
capricious."" Second., the District Court determined
that the respondents' requests for disclosure were not
made while they were actual participants ofthe benefit
plans but, rather, after they no longer participated."
On appeal, the Third Circuit was less willing to grant
such great deference to Firestone's determinations,
overturning the District Court's holding for the
petitioner on these two counts."
The Court of Appeals held that where an employer
is itself the fiduciary and administrator of an
unfunded plan, its decision to deny benefits should
be subject to de novo judicial review'. It reasoned
that in such situations deference is unwarranted
given the lack of assurance of impartiality on the
part of the employer."
IThe U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to untangle
discrepancies in the standard of review for actions
brought under E RISA.
C. Holding in Firestone
Justice O'Connor, speaking for the Court, rejected
Firestone's multiple arguments that an arbitrary and
capricious standard of review would be appropriate for
civil actions brought under ERISA. Firestone argued
that, since Congress intended to "incorporate much
of ILabor Management Relations Act (L MRA)] law
into 1ERISA . .the LMRA arbitrary and capricious
standard should lalsol apply to ERISA actions."82
Nonetheless, the Court found that the arbitrary and
capricious standard, which is accorded actions under
LMRA, does not automatically translate to ERISA
actions. This is largely because ERISA, unlike
LMRA, "explicitly authorizes suits against . . . plan
administrators [as a] renedy."83
O'Connor subsequently moved to affirm the application
oftrust law principles to ERISA, applying the precedent
set in Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas
Pension Fundv. Central Transport (Central States).
Applying these trust law principles, the Court set
forward that ERISA plan administrators, like trustees,
wxill be subject to "a deterential standard of rev iexx
.x . hen . ..exercise[ing] discretionary poxxers."~
Further, courts wxill apply the de noxvo standard of
rexiexw in those cases involving the interpietation of
a plan's terms.~
As latcr seen in lfetLife, Firestone also raises the policy
concern that these heightened standards of rev iexx
"wxould contraxvene the spirit ofFERISA because it xxould
impose much higher administratixve and litigation costs
and . . .discourage Ithe creation ofl benefit plans."
Nonetheless., the the narrower standard of de novo is
unlikely to create new and litigation under FRISA."
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D. Summary of MetLife and Firestone
The holdings in MetLyet and Firestone are largely
consistent with one another. Courts have indicated that
a plan administrator executes a fiduciary act in making
a benefit determination analogous with fiduciary acts
by trustees in the common lays 7 in its establishment
of de novo and a deferential standard of review,90 the
Supreme Court further sets the tone that the judiciary
will not automatically show discretion to employers
and insurers that administer and fund employee benefit
plans.
IV. ERISA in the Broader
Context
VetLife and Firestone both involve employee benefit
plan-types which fall under the scope of ERISA.
ERISA, however. has even broader applicability and has
come under increased scrutiny as public dissatisfaction
with health insurance in the United States has grown.
This section will discuss the origins of ERISA and its
present-day scrutiny.
A. Original Concerns and Design
Congress passed ERISA out of a concern over the
adequate funding and preservation of employer-
sponsored benefits for employees, which had been
growing over the previous twenty years. 1his concern
developed after the epic collapses of some benefit
plans, such as the collapse of automobile manufacturer
Studebaker in 1963. During a period of financial duress,
Studebaker management and the United Auto Workers
Union (LAW) thinned out the funding timeline of the
pension plan while maintaining wages. 92 The deal only
delayed the company's inevitable collapse by a couple
of years.] Employees of the company, including those
who had forty years or more oftenure, lost approximately
SI5 million in pension benefits.94
With public pressure pushing for government protections
from such catastrophes, Congress finally moved to pass
ERISA. Like most bills that pass Congress, however,
ERISA wxas not wxithout its eompromises. Although the
lcgislation prov ides eertain protections and guarantees to
wxorkcrs as bcneficiaries of employer-sponsored bcnefit
programs, the law also gasve employ ers protections of
their own.>5 Employ ers wh io proxvided E RISA benefit
programs wxere guaranteed federal proteetion from
xvaried and oxverly burdensome state lawxs from the
titty states. Thbus, employ eis xwere given "the ability to
pinovide a unitorm set of benetits to employees aeross
state lines."0 This fedcral pireemption from state laxx
focused on protecting multi-state employers from state
legislators more easily influenced by state lobbyists, and
more willing to make "off-budget regulatory transfers"
leading to an increased cost of health care insurance
nationally.
B. Developing Concerns in Health Care
Although the intent behind ERISA was noble enough,
frustration with the federal preemption of state health
insurance reform has grown over the past fifteen-to-
twentx y ears. In the early to mid-1990s. state governors
were mounting their own federal policy push along side
President Bill Clinton's 1993 national health care reform
proposal. State governors became involved mostly out
of concern that Clinton's proposal would fail." Even
then, governors were frustrated by ERISA and other
federal laws which prohibited states from mandating any
level of health benefits from IERISA-covered employers
while requiring an increase in payments to hospitals and
nursing homes serving low-income populations.99 Mid-
to-large sized employers, however, remained loathe to
forgo their federally protected ability to provide uniform
benefits across all 50 states."9
lhe state clamor tor reform has grown to a fever-
pitch over the past few years. Maryland was the first
state to act., passing the Fair Share H ealth Care Fund
Act (Maryland Health Care Act) in January 2006.101
The Marxland Health Care Act sought to make Wal-
Mart a "poster-child" for the problems with ERISA
protections."02 States complained that. although NWal-
Mart provided a health package that was protected from
state interference, the health package remained out of
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reach for a significant plurality of Wal-Mart's lowest paid workers, leaving
state budgets and state-funded health care programs (e.g., Medicaid) to
cover the gaps in coverage.i10 In fact, Wal-Mart would have been the only
employer affected by the Maryland law' 04 which would have required the
company to contribute "8 percent to 11 percent of their payroll to health
insurance or contribute a fee to a state fund." the Federal District Court
intervened and found that ERISA preempted the Maryland law, thus making
it invalid.i0 Despite the contravening federal ruling, Maryland's legislative
efforts and those of other states embody the notion that, over time, ERISA
has given greater leverage to "large employers at the expense of individuals
and small businesses, who lacked capital to self-insure or cover their own
health care costs.""
Even with the threat of ERISA preemption litigation, another state,
Massachusetts, has begun implementing a comprehensive health
care reform package that was signed into lawx in April 2 00 6.1os The
Massachusetts law creates a mandate that individuals purchase health care
insurance, while assessing per-worker tax on employers with ten or more
employees who do not already provide insurance to their employees. Io The
plan also proposes to extend subsidies to low-income families and expand
Medicaid coverage in the state.Io Although Maryland's attempt at reform
was quickly struck down under ERISA. Massachusetts's reform proposal
remained unchallenged."' Twxo key differences protecting Massachusetts
from preemption challenges are that, first, the program only assesses
those employers who do not already provide a health care benefit (i.e., an
ERISA protected benefit)." Conversely, the Maryland plan unabashedly
targeted Wal-Mart, a company already providing a health benefit, albeit
meager.i Second, the mandates on employers are loosely defined as
requiring "fair share contributions to health care" and "cafeteria plan[s]
that permi[t] workers to purchase health care with pre-tax dollars.114 hese
two differences represent key negotiations by Massachusetts legislators,
who recognized the goals and preemption authority of ERISA and worked
toward a solution that fills in the gaps left by E RISA.
V Conclusion
A discussion tying together a seemingly narrow Supreme Court ruling
on the standard for judicial review of an employee's denial of long-term
disability benefits and sweeping state-led health care reform may be
seen as loosely drawn together. Case studies - ranging from disability
benefit challenges in V/MetLif, to pension benefit challenges in Firestone,
to federal preemption of Maryland's refonm, to whether compromises in
Massachusetts xwill protect thxeir attcnmpt at unixversal health care coxverage
-all fall under the xvery large federal umbrella of ERISA.
In many ways, that the Massachusetts ref oim package becan implementation
in 200i7 xwitaout a legal challenge under ERISAis impressixve in and of itself.
As showxn histoirically by C enta States and Fircs tone, large employ ers
aggressixvely defend their autonomous discretion to create and maintain
emnployeec benefit progranms that cross state lines. In fact, as recently as
Noxvember 2007, large employ ers like AT&T and Xerox teamed together
in a lobbying coalition, the National Coalition on Benefits, to prcserxe their
nationwxide autonomy." With tfhe formation of the coalition, a General
The lack of challenge to Massachusetts's reform package and the Supreme
Court's conflict of interest bar-setting in Adetlife may be indicators of the
shifting policy environment alluded to by American Enterprise Institute
Fellow Scott Gottlieb, recognizing the oversized leverage enjoyed to date
by large employers under ERISA.117 Indeed, in his JetLife dissent, Justice
Scalia expressed the view that the majority had gone too far in its wholesale
declaration that both third-party insurers and employers operated under an
inherent conflict of interest which must be weighed in review of benefit
denials."' Properly interpreted, rather than simply affirming the Court of
Appeals' ruling against MetLife, or even denying certiorari, the majority
instead chose to make a seemingly small policy declaration that these
plans and employers should be on notice of improper administration of
their employee benefits. Iurther, given the Court's ease in applying these
standards across different forms of IRIS-A-covered plans, all administrators
of I RISA-covered plans, including health care management organizations
and pharmacy benefit managers, should consider taking a cautionary
approach rather than an overly cavalier attitude towards benefits' denial
and cost control.
T-aking a view across the spectrum of IERISA protections for employers
and employees, there have been growing concerns over gaps and cracks
in benefits coverage from health care in Massachusetts to disability
benefits provided to Sears employees like respondent Wanda Glenn. Thus
far, analysts believe that MetLufe's holding will only "make a difference
in close cases."' 9 That said, large employers and their insurers should be
watchful of large-scale legislative attempts to reform and even overhaul
ERISA and health care at large.
Motors (GM) government affairs executive cited the motivation to join as a
desire to keep benefits at "the same level" for all GM employees."1
Health Law & Policy
Fal 2008
